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Abstract
An RSA modulus is a product M = pl of two primes p and l.
We show that for almost all RSA moduli M , the number of sparse
exponents e (which allow for fast RSA encryption) with the property
that gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1 (hence RSA decryption can also be performed)
is very close to the expected value.
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1 Introduction
Let M be an integer, and let ϕ(M) denote the Euler function.
We recall that given an integer e with gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1, one round of
the RSA encryption of a message x ∈ [0,M − 1] consists of the modular
exponentiation xe ≡ y (mod M), which produces an encrypted message
y ∈ [0,M −1]. Because gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1, if the factorization of M is known
(hence the value of ϕ(M) can be computed), one can find an integer d with
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(M)). (1)
The decryption then consists of the modular exponentiation
yd ≡ xed ≡ x (mod M).
In this paper, we estimate the number of sparse exponents e, which support
fast modular exponentiation xe (mod M) and therefore speed-up RSA en-
cryption, that also satisfy the condition gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1.
It is often recommended to select the encryption (or decryption) exponent
in the RSA algorithm as a sparse integer (with say at most k non-zero binary
digits); see Section 14.6.1 of [12]. If e is an n-bit integer with only k non-zero
binary digits, then the computation of xe (mod M) by repeated squaring
requires n + k modular multiplications, while for an arbitrary n-bit integer
it is about 2n operations in the worst case and about 1.5n operations “on
average”. However, since we also require the condition gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1
for decryption, it is not clear how many such exponents are available. We
remark that despite the existence of faster exponentiation methods, repeated
squaring still remains one of the most commonly used in practice. In any
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case, studying the properties of sparse integers is a very natural number
theoretic question.
To be more precise, let us denote by Nn,k(M) the set of e ∈ [1, 2n − 1]
with exactly k non-zero binary digits and such that gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1. We
will show that the cardinality Nn,k(M) of Nn,k(M) is close to its expected
value
Nn,k(M) ∼ 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M = pl, where p and l are
two prime numbers. We remark that for an even m there are ϕ(m) integers
x ∈ [0, m/2 − 1] for which gcd(2x + 1, m) = 1, thus the density of such
x ∈ [0, m/2− 1] is equal to 2ϕ(m)/m.
Throughout the paper, P denotes the set of primes; log z and ln z denote
the binary and natural logarithms of z > 0, respectively.
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2 Counting Sparse Encryption Exponents
For an integer n, we denote by Rn the set of n-bit integers that are products
of two primes, that is,
Rn =
{
M = pl : 2n−1 ≤ M < 2n, p, l ∈ P
}
.
Let us consider the sum
Wk(n) =
1
|Rn|
∑
M∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Theorem. For any k and n with k ≤ (n+ 1)/2, the bound
Wk(n) = O
(
kn3
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp
(
−ck3/2n−1
))
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holds for some absolute constant c > 0.
Proof. Let us denote by µ(m) the Mo¨bius function. Recall that µ(1) = 1,
µ(m) = 0 if m is not square-free, and µ(m) = (−1)ν(m) otherwise, where
ν(m) is the number of prime divisors of m ≥ 2. From the inclusion-exclusion
principle (see also Theorem 2.1 of Chapter 2 of [13]), we see that
Nn,k(M) =
∑
m|ϕ(M)
µ(m)Tn,k(m),
where Tn,k(m) is the number of e ∈ [1, 2
n−1] with exactly k non-zero binary
digits and such that e ≡ 0 (mod m). If m is odd, it is easily seen that
Tn,k(2m) = Tn−1,k(m) and µ(2m) = −µ(m); consequently
Nn,k(M) =
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)(Tn,k(m)− Tn−1,k(m)) =
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)T ∗n,k(m), (2)
where T ∗n,k(m) is the number of e ∈ [2
n−1, 2n − 1] with exactly k non-zero
binary digits and such that e ≡ 0 (mod m).
By Theorem 2 of [10], there exist absolute constants c1, c2 > 0 such that
Tn,k(m) =
1
m
(
n
k
)
(1 +O (exp(−c1k/ logm)))
uniformly for m ≤ K, where K = exp(c2k
1/2). For any such m, we have
T ∗n,k(m) =
1
m
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
(1 +O (exp(−c1k/ logm))) . (3)
To estimate T ∗n,k(m) for larger values of m, we remark that if m lies in the
range 2s ≤ m ≤ 2s+1 − 1 and if m|e, then those bits of e in the rightmost
s positions are uniquely determined by the bits in the leftmost n−s positions.
Since the first bit of e is 1, we have
T ∗n,k(m) ≤
k−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1− s
j
)
.
For any integer s ≥ 0, we have the bound
T ∗n,k(m) ≤ 2
n−1−s < 2n/m. (4)
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If 2k ≤ n− s+ 1, we have a better estimate
T ∗n,k(m) ≤ k
(
n− 1− s
k − 1
)
.
Because 1− z ≤ exp(−z) for any z ≥ 0, we obtain
n− 1− s− j
n− 1− j
≤ exp(−s/(n− 1− s− j)) ≤ exp(−s/(n− 1))
for j = 0, . . . , k − 2. Therefore,(
n− 1− s
k − 1
)
≤
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−s(k − 1)/(n− 1)).
Using this inequality and defining
ϑ =
k − 1
(n− 1) ln 2
,
we obtain
T ∗n,k(m) ≤ k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
2−sϑ ≤ k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
2ϑm−ϑ ≤ 2k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
m−ϑ. (5)
Note that ϑ < 1 since 2(k − 1) ≤ (n− 1).
Now we consider two separate cases. First, suppose that K < 2n−2k+1,
and put L = 2n−2k+1. We use the bound (3) for m ≤ K, the bound (5) for
K < m ≤ L, and the bound (4) for m > L. Therefore, from (2) we derive
Nn,k(M) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
) ∑
m|ϕ(M)
m≤K
m odd
µ(m)
m
+O
((
n− 1
k − 1
) ∑
m|ϕ(M)
m≤K
m odd
exp(−c1k/ logm)
+k
(
n− 1
k − 1
) ∑
m|ϕ(M)
K<m≤L
m odd
m−ϑ + 2n
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m>L
m odd
m−1
)
.
Since ϑ < 1, one can extend the first summation to include all odd divisors
of ϕ(M) with the same error term. Because ϕ(M) is even we have
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m even
µ(m)
m
=
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(2m)
2m
= −
1
2
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)
m
.
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Therefore
1
2
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)
m
=
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)
m
+
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m even
µ(m)
m
=
∑
m|ϕ(M)
µ(m)
m
.
Using the well known identity
∑
m|ϕ(M)
µ(m)
m
=
ϕ(ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
,
which follows from the inclusion-exclusion principle (see also Theorem 2.1 of
Chapter 2 of [13]), we obtain
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m odd
µ(m)
m
= 2
ϕ(ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
.
Hence,
Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
= O
( ∑
m|ϕ(M)
m≤K
m odd
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c1k/ logm)
+k
(
n− 1
k − 1
) ∑
m|ϕ(M)
K<m≤L
m odd
m−ϑ + 2n
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m>L
m odd
m−1
)
= O
(
τ(ϕ(M))
((
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c1k/ logK) + k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
K−ϑ + 2n/L
))
= O
(
τ(ϕ(M))
((
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c1k/ logK) + k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
K−ϑ + 22k
))
,
where τ(r) denotes the number of integer divisors of r ≥ 2.
As before we have
22k−2 ≤ (2k − 2)
(
2k − 2
k − 1
)
≤ (2k − 2)
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp (−(n− 2k + 1)(k − 1)/(n− 1))
= (2k − 2)
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
2−ϑ(n−2k+1) ≤ (2k − 2)
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
K−ϑ.
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Therefore,
Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
= O
(
τ(ϕ(M))k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp
(
−c3k
3/2n−1
))
where c3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
Next we turn to the case K ≥ 2n−2k+1. We use the bound (3) for m ≤ K,
and the bound (4) for m > K. Proceeding as before, we obtain in this case
Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
= O


∑
m|ϕ(M)
m≤K
m odd
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c1k/ logm) + 2
n
∑
m|ϕ(M)
m>K
m odd
m−1


= O
(
τ(ϕ(M))
((
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c1k/ logK) + 2
nK−1
))
= O
(
τ(ϕ(M)) exp(−c4k
1/2)
((
n− 1
k − 1
)
+ 2n
))
.
It follows from Lemma 8 of [11] that(
n− 1
k − 1
)
≥ (2n)−1/22(n−1)H((k−1)/(n−1)),
where
H(α) = −α logα− (1− α) log(1− α), 0 < α < 1.
Note that H(α) is strictly increasing for 0 < α < 1/2, as is easily verified.
For 0 < δ < 1
H
(
1− δ
2
)
= −
1− δ
2
log
1− δ
2
−
1 + δ
2
log
1 + δ
2
= −
1− δ
2
(log(1− δ)− 1)−
1 + δ
2
(log(1 + δ)− 1)
= 1 +
δ
2
log(1− δ)−
δ
2
log(1 + δ).
Taking into account that ln(1± δ) = O(δ) we obtain
H
(
1− δ
2
)
= 1 +O(δ2).
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From the condition on K we derive the inequality
1
2
≥
k − 1
n− 1
≥
1
2
−
logK
2(n− 1)
=
1− δ
2
,
where
δ =
logK
2(n− 1)
= O(n−1/2).
Therefore
H
(
k − 1
n− 1
)
≥ H
(
1− δ
2
)
= 1 +O(n−1).
Thus (
n− 1
k − 1
)
≥ 2n+O(logn)
and we obtain
2nK−1 ≤
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp(−c4k
1/2)
for some absolute constant c4 > 0.
Therefore for any k ≤ (n+ 1)/2 we have
Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
= O
(
τ(ϕ(M))k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp
(
−c5k
3/2n−1
))
for some absolute constant c5 > 0.
To complete the proof, recall that τ(rs) ≤ τ(r)τ(s) for integers r, s ≥ 1.
Consequently∑
M∈Rn
τ(ϕ(M)) ≤
∑
M=pl∈Rn
τ(p− 1)τ(l − 1) ≤
∑
p∈P
p<2n
τ(p− 1)
∑
l∈P
2n−1/p≤l<2n/p
τ(l − 1).
From Theorem 7.1 of [13] we have∑
l≤L
l∈P
τ(l − 1) = O(L).
Hence,
∑
M∈Rn
τ(ϕ(M)) = O

2n ∑
p<2n
p∈P
τ(p− 1)
p


= O

2n
n∑
j=1
2−j
∑
2j−1≤p<2j
p∈P
τ(p− 1)

 = O (2nn) .
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Thus
∑
M∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣Nn,k(M)− 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
∣∣∣∣∣
= O
(
kn2n
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
exp
(
−c5k
3/2n−1
))
.
From the prime number theorem, one easily derives that |Rn| ≥ c62nn−2 for
some absolute constant c6 > 0, and the result follows. uunionsq
In particular, we see that for any 1/3 > ε > 0 and k ∼ n2/3+ε the bound
Nn,k(M) = 2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
(1 +O (exp (−nε)))
holds for almost all M ∈ Rn.
3 Remarks
Let t, s be nonzero integers and n = st. We think of the binary representation
of an n bit number as a sequence of t blocks of s bits each. Let Nn,k,t(M)
be the set of e ∈ [1, 2n − 1] with exactly k non-zero bit blocks and such that
gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1. Let Nn,k,t(M) denote the cardinality of Nn,k,t(M). Is it
true that
Nn,k,t(M) ∼ 2
s(2s − 1)k−1
(
t− 1
k − 1
)
ϕ (ϕ(M))
ϕ(M)
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M = pl, where p and l are two
primes?
Note that the case s = 1 reduces to what has already been shown. The
motivation for the problem comes from the fact that in order to speed up
exponentiation one sometimes uses the window method (see Algorithm 14.82
of [12]). Here, rather than “sparse” RSA exponents one is interested in using
“block sparse” RSA exponents.
It is known [1, 2, 3, 14, 15] that if some information about the bits of
the decryption exponent d is available then the corresponding encryption is
vulnerable to various attacks. Thus it will be very important to show that
the set of d defined by (1) for e ∈ Nn,k(M) is uniformly distributed modulo
ϕ(M). Although we hope that the method of [6] combined with the Hua
Loo Keng method of estimating of exponential sums can be applied to this
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problem, so far there have been several obstacles that we have not been able
to overcome.
On the other hand, there does exist a slightly different set of encryption
exponents that also admit fast modular exponentiation (because they are
small) and for which the corresponding set of decryption exponents can be
shown to be uniformly distributed. The result is based on a recent estimate
of a double exponential sum from [7, 8, 9]; see also [5]. To be more specific,
it follows from Theorem 2 of [7] than for any ε > 0, there exists a constant
c(ε) > 0 that for
X =
⌊
exp
(
c(ε)(logM)2/3+ε
)⌋
the inverses modulo ϕ(M) of the elements
E = {e = pl : p, l ∈ P, X ≤ p < l ≤ 2X, gcd(pl, ϕ(M)) = 1}
are uniformly distributed modulo ϕ(M). For any e ∈ E , the exponentia-
tion xe ≡ (xp)l (mod M) requires only O
(
(logM)2/3+ε
)
modular multi-
plications, which is much smaller than what is required for a general expo-
nent. On the other hand, since the corresponding decryption exponents are
uniformly distributed, it is very unlikely that they will possess any special
properties that make them vulnerable to attacks similar to those described
in [1, 2, 3, 14, 15].
Finally, it is easy to derive from Theorem 3.1 of [4] that for all integer
M ∈ [2n−1, 2n − 1], except maybe o(2n) of them the bound
τ(ϕ(M)) ≤ 2(0.5+o(1)) ln
2 lnM
holds. Using this bound one can show that Nn,k(M) is close to its expected
value for almost all integer M ∈ [2n−1, 2n − 1] (rather than just for almost
all M ∈ Rn).
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